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Sport and Peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine 
Abstract 
Those working in the Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) sector often claim that sport 
can, and does, make a difference. This article assesses this claim in the context of the conflict 
between the Israelis and Palestinians. Attention is given to the ‘peace’ component within the 
SDP initialism and on what ‘peace’ means in this conflict. An assessment is made of the work 
of thirteen organisations engaged in peacebuilding in this region. The article identifies that 
many of the sport-for-peace schemes involve Israelis and Palestinians/Arabs within Israel with 
few schemes seeking to involve Palestinians who live in the West Bank, in Gaza or in refugee 
camps in neighbouring countries. It is concluded that sport is not an appropriate vehicle for 
peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians because there is no peace – a necessary 
precursor for reconciliation. Realpolitik, in the form of Israeli territorial expansion and the 
Palestinian struggle for basic human rights, leaves sport-for-peace schemes attempting to build 
a bridge too far.1  
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Introduction 
Many of those involved in Sport for Development and Peace work claim that sport can, and 
does, make a difference in regions that have experienced conflict. One region in which Sport 
for Development and Peace (hereafter, SDP) organisations have been active is Israel/Palestine. 
However, in 2017 Jibril Rajoub (head of the Palestinian Football Association), criticised those 
who were seeking to build bridges between the Palestinians and Israelis, stating, “any activity 
of normalization in sports with the Zionist enemy is a crime against humanity” and urged “all 
individuals and institutions [to] distance themselves from such activities” (Warshaw, 2017; see 
also Ber, Yarchi & Galily, 2017; Galily, 2018). Rajoub’s calls for sports organisations to 
distance themselves from attempts at normalisation is part of a wider narrative led and 
coordinated by the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions movement (Bakan and Abu-
Laban, 2009; Barghouti, 2011; Lim 2012). Taking inspiration from the South African 
anti-apartheid movement, the Palestinian-led Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions 
(BDS) global movement maintains that Palestinians are entitled to the same rights as the 
rest of humanity until Israel complies with international law.  
In 2015, a letter was published in the British Guardian newspaper arguing against a proposed 
boycott of Israel and for greater dialogue. The letter contained many of the tropes used by 
bridge-builders and claimed that dialogue would develop greater coexistence between the 
Israelis and Palestinians and “through such understanding and acceptance […] movement can 
be made towards a resolution of the conflict” (Rowling, et al, 2015). The letter echoed the 
position of those who were against a boycott of Apartheid South Africa and were calling instead 
for greater dialogue and ‘bridge-building’ with the South African government and its sporting 
organisations in the hope that it would bring gradual and peaceful change (Booth, 2016; Keech 
and Houlihan, 1999; Merrett, 2010). Comparisons between Apartheid South Africa and Israel 
should be used with caution, but some parallels have been drawn (Dart, 2017; Di Stefano and 
Henway, 2014; MacLean, 2014). During the Apartheid era, few international organisations 
were engaged in SDP work designed to bring the different ethnic communities together and it 
was, arguably, only after the collapse of the Apartheid state that SDP made a meaningful 
contribution. 
This article will offer a comprehensive assessment of the role of ‘sport-for-peace’ schemes 
associated with the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is positioned as a critical and politically 
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grounded analysis to the notion of sport-for-peace in the highly contested regions of Israel 
and the Occupied Territories. It is recognised that this is not a wholly ‘objective’ study 
but is a response to the orthodoxy within current sport-for-peace literature.2 The article 
is a critical assessment of the extent to which there is a de-historicization and/or de-
politicization within SDP research. It will critique the current state of sport-for-peace 
initiatives and practices, and, from the data presented, conclude that because SDP 
organizations are deliberately ‘avoiding politics’, their projects are unlikely to be 
successful. Despite the duration and high profile of this conflict, it has received relatively little 
attention beyond the University of Brighton’s ‘Football for Peace’ project.  
This article identifies thirteen NGOs operating under the SDP umbrella in a region 
experiencing conflict and where nearly everything is politicised. I discuss what ‘peace’ means 
in the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict and consider the extent to which these 
organisations are able to use sport to bridge significant territorial, ethnic, economic, cultural, 
and religious divides. Massey, et al, (2016) have highlighted the value in re-examining SDP 
initiatives through a framework that connects the specific programming structures and micro, 
meso and macro level outcomes. Similarly, Schulenkorf and Spaaij’s (2016, p.72) have 
suggested that “any SDP project should to be underpinned by robust theory of change: a 
comprehensive description of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a 
particular context”. This article assesses what ‘peace’ means in the context of ‘sport-for-peace’ 
and what other criteria are used by those attempting to bridge divides and create sustainable 
peace in communities experiencing conflict. I discuss the nomenclature of SDP, what 
constitutes ‘peace’ and the extent to which ‘bridge-building’ does, according to Rajoub, 
legitimise the systematic and structural oppression of the Palestinian people.  
The Never-Ending Conflict 
It is not possible here to offer a full explanation of the complex relationship between the Israeli 
state and the Palestinians. As Sugden (2008, 2010) suggests, it is necessary to summarise those 
socio-political and demographic features that pertain to the topic under discussion with 
Reychler (2006) stating that ‘contextual judgement is more important than knowledge of 
the ten best peacebuilding practices in other situations’. Immediately following the UN 
Resolution 181 (II) in 1948, the State of Israel was established in an area hitherto known as 
Palestine and a civil war began (Morris, 2001). A ceasefire was declared in 1949 but Palestinian 
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refugees continued to be displaced to neighbouring countries, the Gaza Strip and to the area to 
the west of the River Jordan (i.e. the West Bank), which was annexed by the Jordanian 
Kingdom in 1950; this claim was relinquished in 1988. Palestinians who fled at this time 
remain unable to return to their homes (Pappe 2007), with the 1967 (‘Six-Day’) war resulting 
in greater oppression of Palestinian population (Bregman, 2014; Zertal and Eldar, 2007).  
It is important to distinguish between various Palestinian groups: those living in Israel; in the 
West Bank and in the Gaza Strip (the Occupied Palestinian Territories); in refugee camps in 
neighbouring countries; and in a global Palestinian diaspora. The Israeli Civil Administration 
(ICA) and Palestinian Authority (PA) estimate that between 1.5 and 1.8 million Israeli Arabs 
live in Israel (forming between 17% and 20% of Israel’s population). Although they have equal 
legal rights, this segment of the Palestinian population has been subject to discrimination in 
terms of education, employment, health and housing. Their experiences are unlikely to improve 
given the introduction of legislation that defines the Israeli state as belonging exclusively to 
the ‘Jewish people’ (Beaumont, 2018). A further 4.9 million Palestinians live in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (hereafter, OPT): 3 million in the West Bank and 1.9 million in the Gaza 
Strip (Berger and Khoury, 2018). Palestinians living in the OPTs3 are subject to collective 
punishments, house/village/community demolitions, travel restrictions, state torture, detention 
without trial, assassination, mass unemployment, subsistence wages, poor living conditions, 
inadequate health services, sub-standard transport, housing shortages and inferior educational 
opportunities (Pappé, 2017). Oxfam (n.d.) have reported that nearly one in three working age 
Palestinians under 29 are unemployed, with many Palestinians working in ‘illegal’ Israeli 
settlement factories and farms that are part-funded by the Israeli government. A further two 
million Palestinians are refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Despite identifying these 
different segments, it is important not to fragment the Palestinian population and thus endorse 
the Israeli state’s practice of ‘divide and rule’, most notably by their intermittent willingness to 
work with the Palestinian Authority (in the West Bank) but not with Hamas (based in Gaza) 
who Israel regards as a terrorist organisation. 
The Israelis and Palestinians began negotiating in 1991 with much of the ‘peace process’ 
conducted under the auspices of the United States government. While peaceful relations have 
been established between Israel and some of its neighbours (including Egypt and Jordan), a 
meaningful peace with the Palestinians has failed to materialise; reasons cited include the 
oppressions and indignities cited in the previous paragraph, a rightward shift in the Israeli 
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electorate shifting (since 1977) and the Palestinians being politically divided between the 
Hamas and Fatah political factions. At the heart of the conflict is land/territory with the ‘two-
state’ solution becoming increasingly irrelevant as Israel occupies more of the West Bank, land 
that was previously seen as a possible territory for a Palestinian state; the illegal Israeli 
settlements are widely cited in political discourse as ‘facts on the ground’. According to Thrall 
(2017), the lack of a meaningful resolution is because the current status quo is preferable to the 
Israelis than any peace that involves conceding land. Discussion of peace necessarily involves 
the (illegal) occupation and settlements on the West Bank, Israeli concerns over security and 
the construction (between 1994 and 2014) of the ‘Peace Wall/ Barrier’, the millions of refugees 
in the OPTs (and their ‘right of return’), and the status of Jerusalem (Kelman, Mattar & Caplan, 
2018; Ozerdem, Thiessen & Qassoum, 2016). 
Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution and Sport for Peace 
Proposing a precise definition of peacebuilding is not a straight-forward task. Reychler 
(2010) has noted that in academic discourse, ‘peacebuilding’ is increasingly used to 
“cover all activities undertaken before, during, or after a violent conflict to prevent, end, 
and/or transform violent conflicts and to create the necessary conditions for sustainable 
peace”. Many of the aims of peacebuilding intersect with those associated with 
peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. Whereas peacemaking involves stopping an 
ongoing conflict, peacebuilding activities can occur either before a conflict starts or after 
it has ended and concerns itself with addressing the root causes of violence, be these 
territorial, economic, social and/or political in origin. Peacebuilding is also concerned 
with preventing any return to direct violence and often develops partnerships between 
different actors including grassroots organisations, national and international NGOs, and 
national governments. 
In their study on the peacebuilding work of the United Nations, Lambourne and Herro 
(2008) identify how peacekeeping theory and ideas about best practice by those involved 
in sustainable peacebuilding were given a boost in 2005 with the creation of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission. For Reychler and Stellamans (2005) sustainable peace is 
characterised by the absence of physical violence; the eradication of unacceptable forms 
of political, economic and cultural discrimination; self-sustainability; a high level of 
internal and external legitimacy or approval; and constructive management and 
transformation of conflicts. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) identified seven stages required 
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for successful peacebuilding and developing a self-sustaining peace: national security; 
regional security; ‘quick wins’; the rule of law and constitutional consent; right to 
property; democracy or wider participation; and genuine moral and psychological 
reconciliation; none of these can be found in the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
For Lambourne and Herro (2008) the cessation of open, armed conflict and a mechanism 
for reducing threats of further violence are essential for building peace, with Lederach 
(1997) suggesting that peacebuilding involves not only the ending of violence but also a 
transformation in the relationships among those affected.’ Whilst there is not currently 
open military fighting, the Israel/Palestine conflict is, after 70 years, the longest in modern 
history. In such circumstances, it would be more useful if the term peacebuilding was 
limited a situation of post-conflict. 
The term ‘Sport for Development and Peace’ was readily adopted by international sport 
federations, international and national non-governmental organizations, national governments 
and local organisations who saw it as an attractive, low-cost, interventionist tool to foster social 
cohesion, prevent and reduce conflict and build peace (Burnett, 2015; Darnell and Hayhurst, 
2012; Giulianotti, 2011; Lindsey, 2017; Lindsey & Darby, 2018; Lindsey and Grattan 2012; 
Schulenkorf and Adair, 2013; Svensson & Levine, 2017). The SDP sector is dominated by the 
‘development’ element with ‘peace’ research focused on those countries in a post-conflict 
phase and where different communities are seeking greater integration and reconciliation 
(Gasser & Levinsen, 2004; Giulianotti, 2011; Rookwood & Palmer, 2011; Schulenkorf, 2010; 
Sterchele, 2013). Popular press reporting on sport-for-peace initiatives often adopt a positive 
tone with similarly positive language found in the marketing and promotional publications of 
non-governmental organizations, sport federations and clubs, and business corporations. 
However, the term ‘bridge-building’ rarely features in the academic literature on SDP. One 
exception is MacLean (2014) who identified how governments in the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand, in the 1960s, were committed to ‘bridge-building’ with the Apartheid South African 
government and sports organisations. However, such policies of ‘constructive engagement’ 
were replaced by international boycotts and isolation with academics continuing to debate the 
role of sport in contributing to the end of Apartheid (Booth, 2016; Morgan, 2017; Hoglund and 
Sundberg, 2008; Vahed and Desai, 2016).  
The SDP sector has (had to) become better at monitoring and evaluation and identify how they 
are ‘making a difference’ (Darnell, 2013; Donnelly, et al, 2011; Harris, 2018; Harris & Adams, 
7 
2016; Levermore, 2011; Nicholls, Giles & Sethna, 2010; Webb & Richelieu, 2016). However, 
for those working on ‘ sport-for-peace’ initiatives there is a lack of consensus on what ‘peace’ 
is and how to evaluate it. Where there have been attempts to engage in the evaluation of ‘peace’ 
schemes linked to the Israel/Palestine conflict, organisations have conducted a survey of 
participants’ pre- and post-camp attitudes. Accepting that they were unlikely to be able to affect 
the wider conditions, they have tended to claim that their work contributed to less negative 
stereotypes of the ‘enemy/others’ (Galily, Leitner and Shimon, 2013; Leitner, Galily, and 
Shimon, 2012; 2014).  
It is important to note the significant role of the Football 4 Peace International organisation, 
not least because of its high profile within SDP literature. Sugden (2010) explains how 
Football4Peace International originated in Northern Ireland’s sectarian ‘troubles’ of the 1970s 
and 1980s (Sugden, 2008; 2010; Sugden and Tomlinson, 2017). In 2001 the Football for 
Peace initiative (which developed out of the World Sports Peace Project) began to work 
in Northern Israel by establishing rudimentary football coaching camps for Arab/ 
Palestinian and Jewish children. Subsequently Football for Peace (hereafter F4P) worked 
with various partners, including the World Sports Peace Project, the German Sports 
University (Cologne), the British Council, the English and Irish Football Associations, the 
Israeli Sports Authority and the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sport. During 2010-2012, 
they received a EU Partnership for Peace Grant (‘Playing for Peace: Strengthening 
Community Relations through Football’) in partnership with the German Sports 
University. Their project work informed several ‘key outputs’ (Caudwell, 2007; 
Schulenkorf, Sugden and Burdsey, 2014; Sugden, 2005; 2008, 2010; Sugden and 
Tomlinson, 2017; Sugden and Wallis, 2007).4 In 2012, F4P and the Israeli Sports 
Authority decided that host communities would run the programmes independently 
within their communities (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2017). Since then F4P has used football 
to help resolve conflict between communities in The Gambia, Jordan, Northern and 
Republic of Ireland, South Africa and South Korea. 
F4P adopts a grass-roots, bottom-up, ripple and sustainable approach to peacebuilding and 
conflict resolution in its work in Israel/Palestine (Schulenkorf, et al, 2014). Much of the F4P 
activity took place in the Galilee region, home to a large number of Palestinians who refused 
to leave (or resisted forcible removal) when the State of Israel was created in 1948. F4P clearly 
recognises the sensitivity of the relationship between sport and politics in Israel/Palestine. F4P 
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founder University of Brighton, Professor John Sugden, has argued that their approach is 
neither idealistic nor simplistic, and in an attempt to pre-empt criticism of the F4P activity in 
the Israel/Palestine conflict, suggests that F4P fully accounts for “the local context; engages 
with and empowers local actors and partners; and connects with wider national and regional 
policy processes” (Sugden, 2010:119). However, it is important to note that F4P works with 
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs located within Israel but not with Palestinians in/from the 
OPTs. F4P did attempt to operate in the West Bank but security concerns cited by the Israeli 
military led them to leave. While recognising the asymmetrical relationship between the Israeli 
Jews and Israeli Palestinians/Arabs, Sugden repeatedly responded to criticisms that their work 
was normalising the situation and that their presence was undermining the principles of passive 
resistance to the occupation. In seeking to build bridges between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli 
Jews inside Israel, F4P claimed to be making a modest contribution to the peace process and 
helping to create ripples that might contribute towards better community relations and any 
future peace deal (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2017). Underpinning Sugden’s SDP work is the 
statement attributed to the 18th-century political philosopher Edmund Burke that ‘the only 
thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.’ But to what extent do 
these ripples generated by F4P affect the wider realpolitik and to what extent do sport-for-
peace schemes operating in Israel/Palestine privilege certain parties and (de facto) legitimate 
an unjust situation? The danger is that F4P has become part of the problem and is not part of 
the solution. 
Method 
The aim of this study was to identify and include all the schemes that operated in the 
region and that could be identified as working under the ‘ sport-for-peace’ umbrella. The 
necessity for organisations to have a public ‘online presence’ meant it was possible to use 
an internet search engine to construct the sampling frame. Using a range of ‘key words/ 
search terms’ thirteen non-governmental organisations were identified. 
Organisations/initiatives that used sport solely within Palestinian communities was 
omitted on the grounds it did not seek to engage both Palestinians and Israelis in ‘peace-
building’ (for example, the Gaza parkour project discussed in Thorpe and Ahmad’s 2015 
study). Given that online content frequently changes, it is necessary to state that the 
search was conducted between December 2016 and July 2018.  
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It is recognised that the use of a search engine is likely to generate ‘results’ that are non-
random (Fricker, 2017); however, this was avoided by using the entire ‘population of 
interest’, specifically those schemes/initiative that use sport for ‘peace and reconciliation’ 
purposes in the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is noted that the potentially large 
volume of online material, its dynamic nature and with the content of a site often differing 
(Zeller, 2017), conspire against the construction of an objective sampling frame. The 
criteria for inclusion was that the scheme had to adopt an explicitly sport-for-peace 
‘bridge-building’ approach that involved both Palestinians and Israelis and that sport 
needed to be a central feature of the organisation’s stated purpose, strategy and activities. 
Schemes that sought to bring together Palestinians and Israelis in a non-sport setting were 
excluded.5 The original intention was to interview representatives from these SDP 
organisations with the organisations subsequently contacted via email with a request for 
interview. Despite repeated efforts to contact the organisations, few responded; possible 
reasons for are the limited resources of the organisations, an unwillingness to subject 
themselves to external scrutiny, and/or their having checked my online profile and publications 
that showed a critical sensibility towards the Israeli state. Their lack of response does however 
mean I am able to circumvent ethical issues linked to anonymity and can identify the 
organisation and draw on their publicly available material. 
‘Sport for Peace’ organisation active in Israel/Palestine 
1. Football 4 Peace International (F4P)
2. Ultimate Peace
3. Mifalot Education and Society Enterprises
4. Peres Centre for Peace
5. Laureus World Sports Academy
6. Peace and Sport
7. PeacePlayers International
8. Right to Play
9. Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE)
10. Generations for Peace
11. Oxfam International
12. Football Beyond Borders (FBB)
13. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA)
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As anticipated by Levermore and Beacom (2012) there is a broad range of organisations and 
programmes that operate under the SDP umbrella. What is readily apparent is their use of a 
shared language that promotes the ‘power of sport’ in creating social change and encouraging 
co-operation, bridging social division and uniting communities. Sport is seen as an instrument 
for bringing peace, promoting mutual respect and tolerance, creating a positive environment 
between the different communities, humanising the ‘other’ and helping to create a sense of 
normality. This study is positioned, in part, as a response to this orthodoxy which 
dominates much of the sport-for-peace literature; it is also an assessment of the extent to 
which there is a de-historicization and de-politicization within SDP schemes linked to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict.  
There is on-going debate as to when researchers should define their coding/analytical 
categories (Silverman, 2014). The identification and definition of the units of analysis for 
web-based content presents a challenge given the combined multiple media forms (Kim 
and Kuljis, 2010). The units of analysis selected were the organisations web-sites (the 
‘home page’ or opening screen of the website, and all material publicly available therein). 
All the publicly available web-based material that pertained to these organisations/schemes 
was examined. These included: annual reports, case studies, testimonials, programme 
descriptions, FAQs, marketing and promotional publications/materials, ‘news’ pages, and 
blogs written by current and former staff and participants. Popular press artefacts (e.g. 
newspaper reports) that were identified on the organization’s websites were also reviewed. 
These units were chosen in order to examine the extent to which ‘bridge-building through 
sport’, according to Rajoub, legitimises the systematic and structural oppression of the 
Palestinian people. A thematic analysis was undertaken with a close reading of all the 
available content accessed via the organisations’ ‘homepage’. The a priori themes used to 
review the organisations’ claims included the delivery of activities, the organisations’ 
stated motivation (including any stated attempts at ‘bridge-building’), whether they 
sought to evaluate their ‘impact’ (including ‘successes’ in contributing to ‘peace’), and 
their stated position on the wider politics of the conflict. 
Discussion  
There are several issues that arise in assessing the role of sport-for-peace schemes in the 
context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. This section discusses three of the issues considered 
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to be fundamental. The first relates to the logistics of the organisation and their 
motivation, specifically the content, the participants, the staff, the venues and 
partnerships. The avoidance of mixing sport and politics is then considered before 
assessing the extent to which the schemes ‘measure success’. Partnership working is 
discussed before concluding with an assessment on the extent to which the organisations 
acknowledge wider political structures. 
The Logistics of Sport-for-Peace Schemes in Israel/Palestine 
In terms of the participants, most of the schemes identified involved Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians (Israeli Arabs) in an attempt to improve community relations between those living 
inside Israel. PeacePlayers International did attempt to twin basketball clubs in Israel and the 
West Bank and sought to build capacity and sporting infrastructure in the West Bank, as well 
as Arab towns in Israel. Generations for Peace also worked within the Palestinian population 
in the West Bank and focused on sport for development (not for peace). What was notable, 
however, was the minimal number of other initiatives that involved Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza. There was no evidence found of initiatives that sought to build bridges between 
the Israelis and the millions of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and/or refugee camps in 
neighbouring countries. 
A similar pattern was identified when reviewing the staffing of these schemes. The vast 
majority of staff were Israeli or from overseas, with Palestinian staffing limited to those living 
within Israel: Palestinian staff representation from the OPTs was negligible. Again, such SDP 
work needs to be viewed as concerned only with ‘bridge building’ within Israel – and not across 
the wider Palestinian population. The Palestinian Arabs living within Israel experience very 
different living conditions from those living in the OPTs. The absence of the millions of 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip from sports-themed bridge-building 
schemes is highly significant. This absence was compounded when noting that Mifalot had 
sent football coaches to Nepal as part of a project sponsored by the German Federal 
Foreign Office and coordinated with Streetfootballworld. The aim of this project was to 
promote education-through-sport, particularly football, as a means of teaching skills (i.e. 
teamwork, leadership and comradery), that could be generalized to the everyday lives of 
the young participants. 
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Most of the activities take place in Israel with some sport-for-development work operating 
exclusively in the West Bank. This is because of the extensive security checks and significant 
delays for Palestinians seeking to leave the OPTs. Free travel in and out of the West Bank (for 
Palestinians) is not possible due to the ‘security/peace wall’ that encircles it and which requires 
people to use Israeli military checkpoints. The travel restrictions imposed on Palestinians 
extend to sports teams, including its Olympic athletes, with travel permits required by those 
seeking to travel outside the West Bank. In Gaza, travel is more restricted with a perimeter 
fence surrounding the area, regular border closures, and an Israeli blockade which has been 
imposed since 2007. 
Claims of bringing together the Israelis and Palestinians could be viewed as misleading as they 
usually refer to the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel proper and not to those in the OPTs or in 
refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Thus, while the SDP work might promote better 
community relations within Israel, it could also be construed as dividing the Palestinians into 
different constituencies. No SDP scheme could be found that sought to build bridges between 
Israelis and Palestinians living in refugee camps in neighbouring countries with possible 
reasons as to why such a limited remit/focus discussed later in the article. 
‘Just let the kids play’ (On Not Mixing Sport and Politics) 
Few of the schemes reviewed discussed the wider political dimensions of their work. Some did 
state that they wanted their participants to leave politics at the door – consciously wanting to 
present their work as apolitical. For example, Ultimate Peace identified that “political 
discussion and solution finding” were deliberately avoided. Instead, they focused on the 
creation of “magical moments … with no awareness of or care about any one person’s culture 
or religion or nationality”.  
Tropes and clichés feature regularly in the SDP organisations’ materials with, at times, an 
almost evangelical belief in the power of sport to resolve the conflict between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. The most persistent message identified in the organisations’ publicity materials 
was the desire to ‘make a difference’. Typically, the organisations expressed this in their 
mission statement and in their expressed intention to bring ‘social change’ by ‘bridging 
divides’, creating ‘co-existence programmes and ‘cohesive communities’ (Mifalot). Others 
sought to be ‘Uniting communities in conflict through sport’ (PeacePlayers International), and 
‘to empower youth to lead and cascade sustainable change in communities experiencing 
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conflict’ (Generations for Peace). Some focused on creating ‘leaders of tomorrow’ to help 
‘change perceptions’ and focused on getting women and girls into sport. Right to Play first 
entered the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza) in 2003 with the ambition of using 
the ‘power of play to educate and empower children to overcome the effects of poverty, conflict 
and disease in disadvantaged communities’. The Peres Centre for Peace 6 viewed sport as a 
vehicle to offer a safe, fun and educational way to bring together Israelis and Palestinians who 
might otherwise not meet. 
One of the most ambitious statements was made by Laureus World Sports Academy who, while 
recognising that “Sport will not – by itself - solve or prevent conflicts”, viewed sport as a vital 
part of peace building strategies which address the ‘underlying causes of conflict’. Although 
they cite one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (‘Peaceful Society: resolving 
conflict’), it was not clear how sport can address the underlying causes of the Israel/Palestine 
conflict (including land ownership). The Peace and Sport organisation operates in a range of 
post-conflict zones and in what they view as ‘lawless areas’ (such as Jerusalem). Using sports 
stars as role models and ‘Champions for Peace’, they claim to have made political leaders and 
governments aware of how sport can be a genuine and effective mechanism for peace. Again, 
it is not explained how ex-athletes have changed Israeli politicians’ behaviour. 
There was evidence of a more traditional sport development approach taken by Ultimate Peace 
(Frisbee) and PeacePlayers International (lacrosse). FC Barcelona and Real Madrid each 
sought to involve themselves in the conflict; FC Barcelona with a ‘peace tour’ (de-San-
Eugenio, Ginesta & Xifra, 2017) and Real Madrid contributing to soccer camps. Between 2011 
and 2016, FC Real Madrid worked with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), to send 
football coaches to West Bank refugee camps. However, in 2016 a workshop designed for 
Palestinian coaches from the OPTs was limited to those based in the West Bank, when coaches 
from the Gaza Strip were refused travel permits by the Israeli authorities (AFP, 2016). 
Some organisations engaged in more traditional sport for community development. Mifalot 
uses ‘sports as a platform for social change’ and to ‘learn life skills’ and groups its programs 
into themes based on ‘youth and community development, female empowerment, special 
needs, civil service and employability, and coexistence and shared society’. Similarly, the 
Laureus World Sport Academy cited the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, the Peace and 
Sport organisation used “sport to tackle social issues”, while Generations for Peace delivered 
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programmes that teach “Youth Leadership, Community Empowerment, Active Tolerance and 
Responsible Citizenship”. The sport-for-development approach was also evidenced in Right to 
Play’s work that aimed to improve children’s positive associations with schools and school 
attendance through weekly educational games. Likewise, Oxfam International were engaged 
in sport-for-development although much of their work was focused on emergency and primary 
health, education, protection of civilians, and the rights of women.  
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) are also involved in more traditional sport-for-development work. Established in 
1949 with the task of providing assistance and protection for the (then) 600,000 displaced 
Palestinians (Pappe, 2007), it is the largest agency within the United Nations. It provides 
education, health care and social services to some of the 5 million Palestine refugees in Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon, West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza (Natil, 2014; 2016). The 
UNRWA and UNOSDP (before its closure in 2017) worked in camps across the region using 
sport to promote education and vocational training, social inclusion, and mutual understanding. 
Various schemes and partnerships were developed including the UNOSDP Youth Leadership 
Programme that provided Israeli and Palestinian youngsters with shared recreational 
experiences. The UNRWA organised football tournaments for young Palestinians unable to 
leave the OPTs and partnered with Manchester City FC to provide Lebanese students and 
Palestinian youth, from refugee camps in Lebanon, to meet each other in a recreational setting 
(UNRWA, 2012). The UNRWA also acted as a conduit for the donation of English Premier 
League football strips to forcibly displaced Bedouin Palestinians; the UNRWA also partnered 
with the Qatar 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Committee to install a football pitch in Yarmouk 
refugee Camp in Damascus. The UNRWA Relief and Social Services Programme in Gaza has 
organized recreational activities for 1,000 children who lost parents during the 2014 conflict 
(UNRWA, 2016), and in one press release, stated that “the refreshing sight of children playing 
football in the midst of difficult times brings hope that although homes can be demolished, 
spirits cannot” (UNRWA, 2014). However, the UNRWA cancelled its summer camps in 2012 
and 2014 due to a lack of funding, and in 2013 called off its annual Gaza marathon in response 
to Hamas’ efforts to restrict women’s participation in sport. UNRWA sport-themes activities 
were criticised by Hamas for corrupting the morals of Palestinian youth, with both Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad offering alternative summer activities for young people in the Gaza Strip in an 
attempt to secure control of the camps (Sherwood, 2010). Whilst the UNRWA ‘Summer Fun’ 
15 
activities do not seek to normalise the situation, they can be seen as an attempt to make life, at 
least temporarily, slightly more bearable for those living in refugee camps. 
Monitoring and evaluation: How does one measure ‘peace’? 
In recent years, there have been increasing calls for better measuring, monitoring and 
evaluation of SDP activity. Much of this evaluation has been at a local level, measuring the 
attitudinal changes of participants directly involved in the scheme/s, with claims that it is 
beyond the scope of specific SDP interventions to ‘measure’ wider impact. The SDP examples 
identified all celebrate the potential of sport and use language replete with claims of how sport 
can bring communities together. Mifalot used soccer in projects that included Palestinians 
and Jordanians, claiming a ‘passion for playing soccer is what unites the Israeli and 
Palestinians’. In their evaluation of the effects of participation in this program Galily, 
Leitner & Shimon (2013) reported positive changes from the pretest to the post-test in the 
areas of trust, hatred, and perceived level of hatred of the other group. Occasionally, the 
limits of sport are acknowledged, but there is an emphasis on individual testimonies and 
individual inspirational stories, often linked to creating future leaders and/or ‘empowering girls 
and young women’ (PeacePlayers). In a reflection of their 2016 Camp, Ultimate Peace posted 
the following, 
One night in the dining room we all realized the extent of the impact of the UP 
program. The campers, losing all inhibition, formed a conga line and ended up on 
stage singing with passion while they waved their painted team flags. How does it 
come to be that 100 Arab, Jewish, and Palestinian youth can co-create a magical 
moment like this, with no awareness of or care about any one person’s culture or 
religion or nationality?7 
In its 2016 annual report Right to Play identify their use of ‘play to build peaceful 
communities’ and that ‘through child-centered games, sports and activities’ they teach 
‘acceptance, bridge differences, foster understanding’ and ‘challenge the negative 
perception and attitudes that can exist between refugee groups and host communities.’ 
The annual report concludes with a financial spreadsheet, a list of those who made 
financial donations (including corporations, governments, NGOs and individuals), and 
individual testimonies (‘Succeeding Through Play’) from a young man based in Uganda 
and young woman in Pakistan. 
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Given the political beatification that followed his release from prison in 1990 it might be 
viewed as blasphemous to criticise African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela’s 
(hyperbolic) statement that ‘sport has the power to change the world’ and to bridge divided 
communities. However, in the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict, it is not clear what model 
of ‘peace’ the SDP organisations are working towards. Sport-for-peace organisations that are 
seeking to build bridges between the Israelis and Palestinians could be argued to be failing to 
recognise ‘the elephant in the room’. The sport-for-peace schemes need to identify their 
response to the decision by the Israeli state, in June 2018, to define itself as a Jewish (only) 
state, to increase (illegal) settlements in the West Bank, increase house demolitions, non-
freedom of movement, arrests and detention without trial (including of children), and to 
continue its eleven-year blockade of Gaza. Against this background, it is suggested that, by 
permitting these SDP schemes, the Israeli government is using sport-for-peace activity to create 
political capital and provide a veneer of normalisation to its brutal, settler-colonial and racist 
policies and allowing the two-state solution to become increasingly unviable.  
Under such circumstances much of the SDP activity reviewed was aimed at getting the 
Palestinian Arabs living in Israel to integrate – with little being done with (or for) the other 
displaced Palestinians. All the schemes discussed in this article  are working with the symptom 
and are making little to no impact on the cause. However well-meaning the majority of the 
sport-for-peace activity might be it is having no impact on the repressive policies of the Israeli 
government. It is not clear from the schemes reviewed how they are using ‘sport’ to ‘bring the 
two communities together’. However, what is evident is that the term ‘two communities’ does 
not include all the Palestinians, but only those who stayed behind in 1947. Thus, these schemes 
must respond to Coalter’s (2007) call for the identification of what is claimed as an outcome 
and to more clearly articulate what they understand by the term ‘peace’.  
Partnerships 
While seeking to avoid the politics of the conflict, working in partnership was an essential 
element in all SDP work in the region (Welty Peachey & Cohen, 2016); as Sugden and 
Tomlinson (2017) have recognised, no-one can operate in Israel and the OPTs without the 
permission of the Israeli government, including its military. Right to Play states that it works 
in partnership with other organisations, but that they do not work with political organisations; 
however, they must work with the Israeli state otherwise they would not get access to the OPTs. 
Ultimate Peace have a collaborative partnership with the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sport 
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and identify how their relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Education allows them to 
leverage their status as “one of the most respected model summer camps in the country”. 
Partnerships were also being developed outside Israel as part of the country’s ‘soft power’ 
agenda (Dart, 2016; Nye, 2008). Mifalot partnered with Israel's Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (part of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and had sent coaches 
to Myanmar, India, Colombia and Vietnam, with plans to visit Botswana, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Macedonia and the Philippines. 
Any SDP partnership with the Israel Football Association (hereafter, IFA) is viewed here as 
being ‘morally bankrupt’ given the IFA’s support for the Israeli clubs based in illegal 
settlements who play in the official league of the IFA. The presence of these teams is a clear 
violation of FIFA’s own statutes (Ahren, 2018) and a violation of international law (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016). Securing the approval/permission of the Israeli state will be harder for 
some SDP activists in light of the Israeli government’s introduction of legislation that prevents 
entry to anyone critical of the Israeli state, including anyone linked to the Boycott, 
Disinvestment and Sanctions movement (Rehman, 2018). Clearly, the ‘ripple model’ 
advocated by the F4P organisation has not reached the IFA or Israeli government and thus 
raises a more fundamental question on the extent to which the ripples extend beyond the 
immediate participants. Arguably, what is needed is greater cognisance of the Palestinian-led 
Boycott, Disinvestment Sanctions movement and Rajoub’s statement (included at the start of 
this article) arguing against any activity that attempts to normalise sport in Israel. As Giulianotti 
(2011, p.22) has explained ‘local communities are understood as best equipped to identify their 
needs, clarify the nature and sources of conflict and choose appropriate strategies and 
responses’. 
Of all the schemes identified in this article, Football Beyond Borders (FBB) was unique in 
adopting and explicitly identifying a political position that supported the Palestinians in their 
struggle for human rights. In their work FBB engaged with Palestinian students, local 
communities and NGOs and used football to challenge dominant narratives of the conflict and 
what they viewed as unfair representation of Arabs and Palestinians in much of the Western 
mainstream media. Critical of what they viewed as Britain’s unconditional support for Israel at 
the expense of the Palestinian people, FBB identified their support the Boycott Divestment and 
Sanctions campaign and the Red Card Israeli Racism group and were amongst those calling for 
UEFA to move their U21 tournament away from Israel in 2013 (Dart, 2017). 
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This section has focused on the issues of the schemes’ logistics, their stated aims, how they 
evaluate ‘success’, and the extent to which they acknowledge wider political structures. 
Underpinning this discussion has the theme of ‘bridge-building’ efforts between Israelis 
and Palestinians within (‘greater’) Israel as opposed to Palestinians living outside of 
Israel. There was clear evidence that these schemes were seeking to utilize sports and 
other recreational activities to generate peaceful relations and foster coexistence amongst 
those living inside Israel’s ‘green line’.8 I now move to discuss why such ‘sport-for-peace’ 
activities are not appropriate at this time. 
Bridge-Building and Structural Failure 
Spaaij and Jeanes (2013) have suggested that many SDP initiatives simply reproduce the status 
quo, with Darnell, et al, (2016, p.7) calling for theoretical approaches that “explicitly politicise 
SDP practice and research, and that ask questions that draw attention to the roots of inequality”. 
Similarly, Silk et al (2014) have argued that those studying SDP activity need to situate it in 
relation to broader social and political forces. This article has proposed that the direct 
factors underpinning the Israel/Palestine conflict must be addressed before any attempts 
are made to use sport to build bridges between the two communities. Any attempts at 
peacebuilding need not only to be coherent but also to be tailored to specific setting of this 
conflict. As Pugh (2000: 121) has noted ‘the ownership of peacebuilding needs to be 
embedded in local communities’. SDP organizations and initiatives that avoid engaging 
with the realpolitik, and which fail to have ‘local’ ownership are unlikely to result in 
legitimate and sustainable outcomes (Barnes, 2006; de Coning, 2016). 
The central issue is that sport-for-peace initiatives are legitimising, intentionally or otherwise, 
a political situation in which the Israeli state continues to move towards the absorption of the 
West Bank by expanding settlements and thus prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. Sport-
for-peace schemes that purport to build bridges between the two communities are failing to 
recognise the unequal power relations. They fail to address the everyday reality faced by 
Palestinians in the OPTs whose first priority is access to a regular supply of clean water, 
electricity, healthcare, education, employment, and freedom of movement. What is significant 
is that there are no Palestinian-led joint initiatives seeking to build bridges with the Israelis – 
all the traffic is one-way.  
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Acknowledging the best of intentions of sport-for-peace activity linked to this conflict is only 
ever going to be appropriate where there are some signs of ‘peace’, or at least a conception of 
a just peace (be this based on a one or two-state solution). There are no signs of this. There is 
no suggestion of how ‘peace talks’ will progress with an increasingly right-wing Israeli 
government and a divided Palestinian people and a political structure split between Fatah and 
Hamas; even if the two Palestinian governments were able to work together, the Israelis have 
stated they would not negotiate with Hamas. This situation confirms Coalter’s (2007) thesis of 
overly ambitious non-sporting agendas that confuse micro-level, limited interventions and 
individual outcomes with broader community macro–level outcomes and which ignore the 
wider socio-political context. As Brazilian educator Paulo Freire explained (cited in Spaaij and 
Jeanes, 2013, p. 451), education is not neutral and that “it either reproduces structures of 
domination or is used to promote freedom and social change.” 
More clarity is needed when citing sport-for-peace schemes linked to this conflict and of 
‘building bridges’ between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Most of the reporting of SDP work 
in the context of Israel/Palestine is not subtle enough to distinguish between the different 
Palestinian groups/populations. Most of the academic focus has been on the work of F4P but, 
as this article has argued, this only involved Israeli Palestinians, with few observers able to 
recognise that this segment of the Palestinian population occupies a different position to the 
millions of Palestinians living in the OPTs or as refugees in neighbouring countries. This article 
endorses the suggestion made by Giulianotti, et al, (2017, p.13) that “from a critical standpoint, 
the greatest challenge faced by SDP agencies involves the micro–macro divide, in terms of 
upscaling their impacts at everyday level in order to influence the larger political and societal 
levels where major conflicts are played out.”  
Before any convincing model of peacebuilding can be applied there needs to be a clearer sense 
of what ‘peace’ means and a recognition of the primary concerns of the Palestinians in securing 
their basic human rights. This will necessarily entail a re-examination by SDP organisations of 
their current resolve to avoid ‘politics’. Given the volatility in the relationship between the 
Israelis and Palestinians, any localised grass-roots ‘successes’ generated by a SDP scheme is 
likely to be temporary when Israeli security (or settlement) concerns assert themselves. There 
should also be more engagement with Giulianotti, et al’s, (2017, p.13) identification of the 
realpolitik and of the political and economic roots of power relations and the struggle for 
20 
recognition by marginalised communities; in the context of Israel and Palestine, between the 
colonisers and colonised. 
Conclusion 
This article has presented a critique of the current state of sport-for-peace initiatives and 
practices in the Israel/Palestine context and has problematized the, at times, hyperbole and 
exaggerated claims made by the ‘bridge-builders’ to use sport to resolve a deep-rooted political 
divide. It has not commented on wider claims about what might be a more effective way 
to do this kind of work. The approach of Football Beyond Borders (FBB) and other 
grassroots initiatives (Hadley, 2017; Simpson, 2015; Totten, 2015), which clearly 
identifies its politics and challenges dominant narratives is the author’s preferred 
approach. Sport-for-peace work that currently takes place in context of the Israel/Palestine 
conflict should be viewed as akin to the situation during the Apartheid era in South Africa 
rather that post-apartheid. Despite those who dismiss the arguments for/against the role of 
sport-for-peace as being largely rhetorical, there are significant issues that must be addressed. 
Of these, arguably the most significant, is that there can be no reconstruction, reconciliation, 
or resolution unless and until there is a political solution. Palestinians who live under Israeli 
occupation are likely to view sport as only ever playing a minimal role.  
While various sport-for-peace activities take place, ‘facts’ (in the form of illegal settlements) 
continue to be built throughout the OPTs. The motivations of those involved in SDP work are 
undoubtedly well-intentioned but it is not evident that there has been sufficient consideration 
of the political consequences (and interpretations) of their work. Their attempts at building 
bridges through sport are misguided and misleading and, in effect, are normalising an illegal 
occupation and an unjust situation. If one limits ones focus to sport, there is clear evidence 
that Palestinian athletes are typically refused travel permits, that the Israeli state has 
deliberately targeted the (sporting) infrastructure and restricted the importation of 
resources that would improve the sport and recreational facilities in the OPTs. In such 
circumstances, some might advocate that ‘doing something is better than doing nothing’, but 
those schemes which do not engage with the fundamentals of the conflict, and which do not 
identify clear, objective criteria for evaluation, and instead claim a position of ‘neutrality’, will 
ensure they remain part of the problem, not the solution. 
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Finally, SDP researchers and practitioners should avoid eliding the terms sport for 
‘development’ and sport for ‘peace’ in the context of Israel's occupation of Palestine which is 
the longest running military occupation in modern history. Acknowledging the statements by 
Howard Zinn (2002) and Desmond Tutu (cited in Younge, 2009) on neutrality, it is, ultimately, 
a matter of personal conscience on how to resolve the ‘Palestinian Question’. In response to 
Sugden’s advocacy of Burke’s statement on ‘good men and evil’, I prefer Hannah Arendt’s 
statement that “most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil”. 
While illegal settlements continue to be built by successive Israeli governments who show no 
signs of engaging in meaningful peace talks, most sport-for-peace activity is little more than a 
smokescreen and propaganda tool for the Israeli government in their continued systematic 
subjection of the Palestinian people. Those interested in bringing about genuine change should 
avoid sport-for-peace activity because, when the games are over, Palestinian participants will 
return home to lives of occupation and oppression, while Israeli youngsters to a future as 
occupier.  
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